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Abstract - Corporate governance has come to the forefront 
of academic research due to the vital role it plays in the 
overall health of economic systems. The wave of U.S. 
corporate fraud in the 1990s was attributed to deficiencies 
in corporate governance. The recent 2008-2009 global 
financial crisis, triggered by the unprecedented failure of 
Lehman Brothers and the subprime mortgage problems, 
renewed interest in the role corporate governance plays in 
the financial sector. The development of a strong corporate 
governance framework is important to protect 
stakeholders, maintain investor confidence in the 
transition countries and attract foreign direct investment.  
This paper looks at the role of corporate governance in 
European transition countries in their transformation to a 
market economy. The paper compares the different levels 
of corporate governance established among the transition 
countries. Using synthetic taxonomic measures a study is 
conducted to look at the degree of corporate governance 
development by the new EU 2004 and 2007 accession 
transition countries and the convergence of corporate 
governance regimes across the countries. Our results 
indicate that transition countries that are closer to the 
English legal origin made greater strides in capital market 
and corporate governance development. 
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Corporate governance generally refers to the set of 
rule-based processes of laws, policies, and 
accountability that governs the relationship between the 
investor (stockholder of a company) and the investee 
(management). Corporate governance attracted a great 
deal of attention in the aftermath of the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997-1998 and the early 2000s U.S. corporate 
scandals, like Enron and World Com. However, once 
the threat of global contagion financial crises passes, 
corporate governance was relegated to the back of 
academic research. The current global financial crises of 
2008-2009 caused by the “excesses of capitalism” once 
again brought attention to the importance of effective 
corporate governance practices. With ever more closely 
integrated globalized financial markets, the newly 
emerging European transition economies particularly 
have been hit hard by the adverse impact of the current 
global financial crisis. Both the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)and the 
OECD promote the development of sound corporate 
governance for transitioning economies and developing 
economies through their initiatives, the Corporate 
Governance Sector Assessment Project (CGSAP begun 
in 2002) and Principles of Corporate Governance (1999, 
2004, 2009), respectively.  
A strong corporate governance foundation is 
important for a growing market economy. It has to 
include the integrity and transparency of financial and 
corporate operations, checks and balances in compliance 
with applicable laws, the practices of sound financial 
and corporate operations and accounting practices that 
are in accordance with international standards. In the 
legal sector, laws that are enacted must be timely and 
consistently enforced. The laws must be clear and 
consistent: in areas of orderly entry and exit of firms, 
property and asset protection of investors and 
transparency of the legal system. Establishing effective 
corporate governance is of particular importance for 
transition countries because its success is crucial not 
only for the growth of a healthy corporate sector but 
also for sustaining a healthy market economy. Bekaert 
et al (2001) find that the liberalization of financial 
markets in transition countries increases economic 
growth by about 2 percentage points per year. Some 
countries like Romania, Ukraine, and Georgia have very 
low effective corporate governance with high incidences 
of corruption and fraud in the political and economic 
systems. Other countries like Poland, Hungary and 
Latvia have established relatively effective corporate 
governance with greater achievements made toward 
market-based economies. 
The problems facing transition countries are 
different from those facing other emerging countries by 
their nature of transforming from a centrally planned 
economy to an open market economy. For transition 
countries with no initial capitalistic framework in place, 
institutional frameworks in all sectors, both private and 
public, which support a capitalistic business 
environment, have to be created simultaneously: 
securities laws, corporate laws, accounting standards, 
sound business practices and ethics, and a judiciary and 
regulatory system. The importance of corporate 
governance for transition countries revolves on 
transitioning to private ownership and control. The 
parallel creation and quality of a system of corporate 
governance and institutions are therefore crucial for the 
development of a sound private market economy. A 
healthy business sector then promotes and sustains 
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productivity and long-term economic growth. Although 
transition countries swiftly established political and 
economic market institutions in the early 1990s in the 
first phase of transformation, the transition from a 
relationship-based to a rule-based political and 
economic system is more difficult and slower. In 
particular, “crony capitalism” tends to be more 
prevalent in transition and emerging economies with the 
politically well-connected parties able to influence 
business practices and legislations in their favor.  
The focus of this paper is the challenge that 
transition countries face moving from a politically-
based relationship to one of a rule-based relationship 
and the role of corporate governance as a major factor in 
the unprecedented transformation of transition countries 
to a market economy. The question of interest is to what 
extent corporate governance has, or the lack thereof, 
contributed to the transformation and development 
transitioning to a market economy. The question of 
corporate governance therefore extends well beyond the 
corporate sector to impact national economic 
development as well for the transition countries. 
2. Literature Review 
The Asian crisis brought the issue of corporate 
governance to the forefront of research. Most of the 
studies on the developing and emerging countries focus 
on the agency problem and weak, dispersed investors. 
Later studies focus on corporate governance in 
developed economies especially after the U.S. corporate 
fraud scandals. The topics range from internal and 
external governance, the role of the Board of Directors, 
incentives and compensations, ethics and transparency. 
Most are based on the Anglo-American (common law) 
models (Chew and Gillan, 2005). This model of widely 
dispersed shareholders where no single shareholder 
owns a majority stake is the basis of most corporate 
governance studies. Most authors argue that the 
protection of investors’ interests can be effectively 
enforced through a strong corporate governance system 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Glaeser et al, 2001; 
Hanousek and Kocenda ,2003). 
The Anglo-American corporate governance system 
differentiates the shareholders from the stakeholders 
with a well-developed external equity market system to 
monitor the manager. The additional protection and 
voice afforded a dispersed shareholders group in the 
Anglo-American model is the liquidity of the market to 
allow exit strategy in the event of weakening internal 
corporate governance. The well developed financial 
market in developed economies with rating agencies, 
market scrutiny and access to timely information is 
another layer of protection for the dispersed 
shareholders.  Another body of studies tests the 
adoption of common laws (Anglo-American) versus 
civil laws (German-French) in the protection of 
investors (Coffee 1999, Pistor, 2000; Mahoney, 2001). 
Mahoney (2001) finds that nations that adopted the 
common laws (English) rather than the civil laws 
(French) system of corporate governance provided 
better protection for investors and have better developed 
financial markets. Mahoney concludes that, during the 
period under study from 1960-1992, common law 
countries experienced faster economic growth than civil 
law countries because common law is more supportive 
of private economic enterprises and property protection 
while civil law is more oriented toward government 
intervention and restrictions. 
Corporate governance studies naturally move to 
focus on the transition countries in their unprecedented 
mass privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
and the structure wherein they operate to transform 
successfully to a market economy. Studies on corporate 
governance structures in transition countries debated 
various issues: the type of ownerships (concentrated 
versus dispersed), the mode of privatization, adequacy 
of shareholder protection and whether legal structures 
must precede privatization. Ownership structures in 
transition countries are still evolving. Widely held firms 
are not the norm due to the small and relatively illiquid 
underdeveloped capital markets.  Corporate governance 
studies performed on developed countries therefore may 
not be applicable to transition countries with such 
different initial conditions. The corporate governance 
problems in transition countries are likely to be different 
from developed countries. Studies on corporate 
governance in transition countries may therefore have to 
take this into account. 
A body of studies looks at whether a transition 
country’s past legal heritage (German, French) 
influences the adoption of the current legal structure and 
corporate governance or whether the Anglo-American 
system is more prevalent (Pistor, 2000;  Martynova and 
Renneboog (2009). In Romania and Poland, the mass 
privatization and dispersed ownerships to employee 
owners and institutional intermediaries help to promote 
the development of the capital and securities markets 
(Gray and Hanson, 1993). Their main argument is that 
the German-Japanese model of active shareholding 
monitoring through intermediaries (banks, outsider, 
employee-owners) can develop closer ties to firm 
managers, better access to information, and deeper 
business knowledge than the Anglo-American model of 
dispersed shareholders. The German-Japanese model of 
more concentrated ownership with corporate 
governance assigned to intermediaries may therefore be 
more appropriate for transition countries. This argument 
is supported by other studies. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
and Rajan and Zingalies (1998) maintain that 
concentrated corporate ownership structures are a 
response to the agency problem and poor ownership 
protection for investors.  Studies by La Porta et al (1997, 
1999, and 1999) also support this hypothesis and that 
the degree of ownership rights and protection affects 
corporate behavior and, consequently, economic 
development. On the other hand, Miwa and Ramseyer 
(2000) argue against concentrated shareholders and 
creditor banks but rather dispersed shareholders are 
more effective in controlling managers in transition 
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countries where the legal environment is ineffectual, a 
situation similar to late nineteenth-century Japan. This 
body of literature looks at the differing degree of legal 
protection with different corporate governance 
structures depending on whether concentrated or 
dispersed ownership is present. 
Privatization of state-owned enterprises goes 
beyond just transferring the assets to private ownership 
in transition countries. Privatization has to be evaluated 
in terms of three areas: the creation of a system of 
corporate governance to foster a healthy environment 
for businesses to flourish, the advancement in legal and 
enforcement infrastructure, and self-sustaining 
economic growth. There are a number of studies on the 
positive and negative effects of privatization in 
transition countries (Table1).  
Privatization of state-owned enterprises is seen to 
be the vehicle by which transition countries are 
transformed to a market economy and takes different 
forms. The expectation is that private ownership would 
spur profit-oriented managers toward market 
restructuring leading to economic growth under the 
presumption of the principal-agent model. In most 
transition countries this expectation has been unfulfilled 
due to the lack of effective corporate governance and a 
major obstacle to a friendly business environment 
(Meyer, 2003).  In transition countries, the problem of 
corporate governance progress is exacerbated by the 
vested interest of the powerful and highly concentrated 
owners with ties to the political structure. This cronyism 
relationship breeds corruption that plagues the early 
transformation efforts of most of the transition countries. 
This is particularly prevalent in transition countries like 
China, Russia, and Bulgaria. In China when the state-
owned enterprises were “corporatized” with majority 
government ownership still
1
, moral hazard incentives, 
kwangsi (relationships), and agency problems 
outweighed emerging corporate governance practices. 
Lin (2001) finds that managers, while gaining greater 
autonomy from the “corporatization” of Chinese state-
owned enterprises, manage the company badly and 
misuse it for self- dealings and embezzlements.  
Privatization of former state-owned assets to private 
ownership does not guarantee that the agent will act in 
the best interest of the principle in transition countries 
with no existing institutional foundation to support 
private ownership. Questions of the role and rights of 
various stakeholders (manager-employee owners, 
government, outsiders, managers, investors, employees) 
of the privatized firms with differing interests have to be 
determined within a legal and regulatory structure.  
The Russian experience questions whether mass 
privatization is the answer in transforming from central-
planning to a market economy. Russia’s mass 
privatization to concentrated manager ownership was 
the antithesis of privatization success: insider self-
dealings, corruption, incompetent management, asset 
stripping and the destruction of minority shareholders’ 
value. Rapid mass privatization without the preceding 
legal and enforcement infrastructure to prevent insider 
self-dealings and corruption impedes effective corporate 
governance and the development of an honest business 
climate (Black et al, 1999). 
Glaeser et al (2001) finds that prior to 1990s 
reforms the Czech securities market was much larger 
                                                 
1
 The four state-owned Chinese banks were privatized 
through IPO offerings in mid-2000s raising 
unprecedented capital funds globally with majority 
stakes still held by the government.  
 
Table 1 - Studies on Privatization Effects on Corporate Governance in Transition Countries 
 
Study Country of Study Positive  Findings 
Estrin et al (2009) CEEB For CEEB countries, mostly positive effects but quantitatively smaller 
for foreign owners; For CIS countries, positive or insignificant effects for 
foreign owners but negative or insignificant effect. 
Frydman, Hessel and 
Rapaczynski (1999) 
Czech Rep., Hungary and 
Poland 
Privatization to outsider owners rather than corporate insiders has greater 
performance effects because of greater entrepreneurial skills. 
Coffee (1999) Poland and Czech Rep. Slower privatization and state-created monitors through investment funds 
(Polish National Investment Funds - NIFs) subscribed to by individuals 
and common law system outperforms the rapid privatization and 
inadequate legal structure. 
Study Country of Study Negative Findings 
Hanousek and 
Kocenda (2003) 
Czech Rep. Disperse ownership and lack of regulations created a weak management 
environment; Improvement in corporate governance after 1995 improved 
firm profitability 
Black et al (1999) Russia Asset stripping by insider mangers, massive theft by kleptocrats, self-
dealings, no restructuring, corruption. Effective institutional structure 
matters more and must precede privatization. 
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than the Polish market. The creation of an independent, 
strong securities commission by Poland to enforce 
corporate governance promoted rapid capital market 
development and a growing business sector. Today the 
Polish stock market, the largest of all the transition 
countries by market capitalization, has two tiers of 
trading: the organized market and the over-the-counter 
market (launched in December 2008), In contrast, the 
Czech Republic experience of employing a small 
ineffective securities commission office in the Ministry 
of Finance and extensive corruption led to corporate 
asset stripping and expropriation of wealth from 
minority shareholders by controlling shareholders and 
the politically connected government officials, 
undermining investor confidence and financial market 
development (Hanousek and Kocenda (2003).  
Another study shows that Poland and Hungary’s 
effective centralized regulatory enforcement of 
securities laws through a strong securities commission 
is more effective than judicial enforcement in the 
protection of the principle’s rights (Oman et al, 2003). 
This body of literature questions the benefit of mass 
privatization before effective legal and corporate 
governance structures are in place, and should precede 
privatization. The good news for transition countries is a 
study by Durnev and Kim (2005). They find that despite 
a weak institutional environment firms with good future 
investment prospects would involuntarily practice good 
corporate governance attracting more shareholders and 
increasing firm value. They find that a firm’s market 
value increased by 9% if the firm’s governance score 
increased by 10 points out of the maximum 100 points.  
 
2.      Corporate Governance in Transition 
Countries 
The difference in the corporate governance problem 
in transition countries is one of controlling versus 
minority shareholders problem. The early privatization 
of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) resulted in mostly 
concentrated ownership by dominant or block-
shareholders, (institutional investors - Hungary, 
management buyout (MBOs) or management-employee 
buyouts (MEBOs) - Poland, employee-owners – Czech), 
giving these controlling shareholders considerable 
greater control over corporate assets than their stock 
ownership warranted. Of even greater concern than the 
concentrated ownership is the prevalence of complex 
ownership structures through cross-shareholdings, 
multiple-class shareholdings with different voting rights, 
pyramidal corporate shareholdings. A landmark study 
by Bebchuk et al (1999) shows that “expropriation 
costs” are very large when such complex shareholdings 
are used to increase control rights beyond their cash-
flow rights, even larger than concentrated ownerships.  
The role of corporate governance to under girth 
weak competitive market mechanisms and democratic 
political institutions is the complementing factor 
necessary to sustain the long-term modernization of the 
transition countries. In other words, the “principal-
agent” relationship that governs most capitalist societies 
that provides the incentives and environment in which 
investors (principals) can reap the profits of their 
investment through their corporations (agents) and the 
behavioral relationship are determined by a set of 
corporate governance standards. EBRD’s Legal 
Indicator Surveys reports that transition countries have 
an implementation gap between the enactment of laws 
and its enforcement. 
Unlike developed countries in the United States and 
United Kingdom with widely dispersed shareholders, 
the principal-agent corporate governance problems are 
primarily due to the agent (manager) perpetrating 
embezzlement and fraud. The corporate governance 
regime of the English legal origins (US-UK) emphasizes 
the protection of shareholders from being expropriated 
by the firm’s management. In contrast, the European 
legal origin countries (French-German) emphasize the 
protection of stakeholders (state, blockholders, 
employees) from expropriation. 
A relationship-based system and investor 
expropriation tends to prevail in emerging economies. 
In Russia, Bulgaria and elsewhere mass privatization 
enriched the oligarchs and the politically well connected. 
The “cronyism” and relationship-based structure carried 
over from the communist era with most of the post-
communist corporate owners part of the politically 
connected or political elite is difficult to root out. The 
lack of effective corporate governance, in particular, 
Russia, engenders a hostile business environment: 
corruption, organized crime, a bias judicial system and 
government interference.  
In the post-socialist European countries, the set of 
corporate governance standards adopted varies which 
may depend on past legal heritage. The group of Central 
and Eastern Europe and Baltic (CEEB) nations has a 
German legal heritage which includes the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Hungary, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. The group 
of South East European (SEE) nations has a French 
legal heritage which includes the Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, 
Romania, Bosnia and Albania. The last group consists 
of most of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS). Pistor (2000) finds that past legal heritage is not 
significant in explaining what predominant system of 
legal structure will be adopted by the transition 
countries. Rather, the adoption during the initial 
transformation period is driven more by the desire to 
converge with the EU legal system with an eye to 
attaining accession or the US system. Pistor also 
observes that differences in legal reforms among the 
transition countries are due primarily to policy makers 
responding to economic changes: greater privatization 
engenders better protection of creditor’s and 
stockholder’s rights or whether the dominant external 
advisors are from the US or EU. Mahoney (2001) 
similarly argues that a nation directly or indirectly 




adopts a set of legal structure in response to change 
rather than solely because of its past legal heritage.  
Poland and the Czech Republic are good examples 
of differences in privatization, corporate governance 
development and economic growth. An interesting study 
by Coffee (1999) compares the differences between 
Poland and the Czech Republic experience (Table 2). 
Both countries adopted corporate law system based on 
the German civil law heritage. The important difference 
is that despite the German heritage, Poland’s securities 
regulations and practices follow the common law 
system of the Anglo-American more closely: greater 
private ownership protection, stringent disclosure 
standards and a strong enforcing securities commission 
agency. Coffee concludes (1) that better securities 
regulation to protect minority shareholders from 
expropriation is more effective than ineffective 
corporate laws, (2) that the Anglo-American common 
laws structure of corporate governance outperforms the 
German-French civil law structure despite their legal 
heritage. The result is the successful growth of equity 
financing for businesses in Poland with a growing 
healthy growing stock market. The Polish stock market 
is one of the largest among the transition countries with 
a market capitalization of U$175.85 billion in 2010; in 
contrast, the Czech Republic stock market capitalization 
is only U$68,831.  
Table 2 shows that none of the EU2004 or 2007 
countries achieved “Very High Compliance” in meeting 
the OECD Principles fully. Poland, Hungary and Latvia 
are rated “High Compliance” with Lithuania moving 
from “Medium Compliance” to “High Compliance” 
from 2002 to 2005. Countries with “High Compliance” 
have existing laws implemented that fulfill the majority 
of OECD Principles. Capital markets are well 
established, existing legislation have to be improved and 
enforced, and an enhancing of the judiciary system to 
adjudicate corporate governance issues competently and 
fairly. In “Medium Compliance” countries, most of the 
laws meet the OECD Principles but requiring consistent 
and effective implementation and enforcement and 
further reforms needed, and capital markets are 
established but small: the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Croatia. In the “Low 
Compliance” category, Romania, basic corporate laws 
are established but of questionable quality, capital 
markets are under-developed or non-existing, and legal 
institutional structures in the enforcement of the laws 
are needed (Chen, 2004). 
A recent study by Martynova and Renneboog (2009) 
creates corporate governance indices to capture the 
major factors of corporate governance as reflected in the 
country’s capital market laws. The study looks at 
whether 30 European countries and the US, including 
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GDP) 
Domestic 



















C C C 25.5 51.0 5,500 4.6 
Estonia 
(2004) 
C C C 8.6 91.9 800 3.5 
Hungary 
(2004) 
B B B 12.1 67.6 1,000 1.7 
Latvia 
(2004) 
B B B 4.9 89.6 2,000 3.5 
Lithuania 
(2004) 
C B B 8.0 60.0* 1,300 6.5 
Poland 
(2004) 
B B B 21.0 55.0 15,000 5.1 
Slovakia 
(2004) 
C C C 5.4 44.7 2,000 7.0 
Slovenia 
(2004) 
C C C 22.5 85.6 592 4.3 
Bulgaria 
(2007) 
C C C 18.5 74.5 7,937 5.5 
Romania 
(2007) 
D D D 11.2 38.5 10,963 5.0 
Croatia 
(likely) 
C C C 40.4 67.1 4,806 4.5 
Rating Legend: A - Very High Compliance ; B - High Compliance; C - Medium Compliance ; D - Low Compliance 
Source: EBRD Transition Reports; Chen, 2004; Transition Report 2005-Annex 1.2. 
*  2007  
 




the new EU countries, over 15 years have converged in 
corporate governance regimes. In particular, the authors 
take into account the heritage of common laws or civil 
laws of the respective countries in constructing the 
indices. In particular, their indices are constructed by 
applying “…unique corporate governance database that 
comprises the main changes in corporate governance 
regulation in US and all European countries […] over 
the last 15 years. The database is based on the study of 
various corporate governance regulations, on the results 
from a detailed questionnaire sent to more than 150 
legal experts, and on direct interviews with some of 
these experts (Martynova and Renneboog 2009, p. 9).” 
The study concludes that countries of German legal 
heritage and the EU 2004 accession countries give more 
decision rights to shareholders. In contrast, countries of 
English legal heritage and the EU2007 accession 
countries provide trustees and representatives (Board of 
Directors) of the stockholders with more control. 
Creditor protection is stronger among former 
communist countries and less in French, German and 
Scandinavian legal origin countries. Continental 
European countries are mostly characterized by 
stakeholder-based regime compared to the US-UK 
stockholder-based regime. Scandinavian and German 
legal origins, and the EU2004 accession countries, 
afforded the least protection for investors. Lastly, the 
authors find that countries of English legal origin 
provide the highest protection for shareholders. 
The question is to what degree has corporate 
governance development progress among the new EU 
transition countries. Our paper is based on the 
Martynova and Renneboog (2009) study. Using the 
indices created by the Martynova and Renneboog (M-R) 
study, we investigate the degree of corporate 
governance development among the EU2004 and 
EU2007 accession countries. We seek to confirm if the 
results from our study indicate a convergence of 
corporate governance among the new EU countries and 
if legal heritage plays an important role in the adoption 
of corporate governance emphasis and whether one 
regime has comparative advantage over the other. This 
has implication as to which direction of corporate 
governance regimes the transition countries should 
continue to emphasize and adopt. 
 
3.  Methodology and Empirical Investigation 
 
In our paper we construct the synthetic taxonomic 
measure (SMR) to evaluate eleven transition countries 
(EU2004 and EU2007 accession countries in Table 2) in 
terms of the degree of corporate governance 
development. The SMR measure defines the distance 
between the certain benchmark and the analyzed 
countries (i.e. objects) in a multidimensional space. The 
corporate governance regimes are characterized by four 
variables that represent the corporate governance 
indices constructed by the M-R study in the four areas: 
(i) anti-director index (LLSV), (ii) shareholder rights 
protection, (iii) minority shareholder rights protection 
and, (iv) creditor rights protection. The benchmark is 
defined as the hypothetical object that is characterized  
 either by the maximal values of indices evaluated for 
the 11 transition countries under study, 
 or by the averages of indices benchmark evaluated2 
for the countries that are classified by M-R 
according to their respective legal origin: English 
(Ireland, UK and USA (Delaware)), French 
(Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Luxemburg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain), German (Austria, 
Germany and Switzerland) and Scandinavian 
(Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) 
legal origin.  
Employing these indices we construct the synthetic 
measure that contains partial measures of corporate 
governance development to obtain the ranking of the 
eleven transition economies over four years
3
: 1990, 
1995, 2000 and 2005. 
The taxonomic measure itSMR  for the i-th country in t-








1   Ttni ,...,2,1;,...,2,1    
 (1) 
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evaluated for standardized variables 0jtz , 
i
jtz  
that describe the benchmark and the i-th 
investigated country, respectively, for each 
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standardized variables, ijtx , jtx , 
x
jtS  - 
observations of for the i-th country, average and 
standard deviation, respectively.  
































                                                 
2 These averages were calculated by Martynova and 
Renneboog (2009) p. 31 – 34. 
3 We choose the corresponding years and the transition 
countries that were considered in the Martynova and 
Renneboog study. 




Other symbols denote: tq , qtS - the average and the 
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As mentioned, the synthetic measures 
iSMR  for 
each transitional country are constructed employing k = 
4 variables using the M-R corporate governance 
indicators: (i) anti-director index LLSV, (ii) shareholder 
rights protection, (iii) minority shareholder rights 
protection and (iv) creditor rights protection in Eq.(2) 
for five different benchmarks in Eq.(3).  
Using as the benchmark maximal value of each of the 











the country ranking is constructed only for comparison 
within the group of transition countries. Employing the 
averages of the countries with the different types of 
corporate governance legal origins (English, French, 
German and Scandinavian) as the benchmarks, we 
compare each transition country to the corporate 
governance of countries with these legal origins, 
respectively.  
The countries under study are grouped according to 
the specified four ranking classifications (Table 3): 
Table 3. Classifications of SMR Country Rankings 
SMR
i SSMRSMR     Class I - Best 
SMRSMRSSMR iSMR   
Class II - Good 
SMR
i SSMRSMRSMR   Class III - 
Average 
SMR
i SSMRSMR     Class IV - Bad 
  
where:    SMR  is the average of iSMR , SMRS  is the 
standard deviation of 
iSMR    
The country rankings results based on the 
iSMR measures, evaluated for the different 
benchmarks, are presented in the tables below. A 
comparison of the SMR results to the EBRD country 
rankings for 2005, where data is available for the same 
year, is also performed (Table 2). However, all 
transition countries are classified only to the three 
classes of B (High Compliance), Medium Compliance 
(C), and D (Low Compliance). 
 
Table 4. 













Poland 1 Lithuania  0.849579 Lithuania  0.802455 Croatia 0.857103 C 
Lithuania 0.835432 Poland  0.842124 Croatia  0.754699 Czech 0.643115 C 
Latvia 0.652312 Croatia  0.74272 Poland  0.647564 Lithuania 0.610393 B 
Croatia 0.638329 Latvia  0.623543 Slovenia  0.492673 Latvia 0.486355 B 
Slovenia 0.610588 Slovenia  0.520134 Bulgaria  0.42807 Poland 0.455114 B 
Slovak 0.489508 Slovak 0.491794 Romania  0.369786 Romania 0.434137 D 
Romania 0.423409 Czech 0.466147 Czech 0.344482 Hungary 0.400301 B 
Hungary 0.400041 Estonia  0.345724 Latvia  0.31596 Slovenia 0.392329 C 
Bulgaria 0.271779 Romania  0.306983 Hungary  0.308682 Estonia 0.30624 C 
Czech 0.212065 Bulgaria  0.180464 Estonia  0.194933 Bulgaria 0.251406 C 
Estonia 0.104785 Hungary  0.061291 Slovak 0.081475 Slovak -0.03024 C 
SMR  0.512568 SMR  0.493682 SMR  0.43098 SMR  0.436932 
 
SMRS  0.256284 SMRS  0.246841 SMRS  0.21549 SMRS  0.218466 
SMRSSMR  0.256284 SMRSSMR  0.246841 SMRSSMR  0.21549 SMRSSMR  0.218466 
SMRSSMR  0.768852 SMRSSMR  0.740523 SMRSSMR  0.64647 SMRSSMR  0.655399 
 
 




Table 4 shows the SMR rankings for all the eleven 
countries taking the maximal values of the variables for 
the eleven transition countries as the benchmark. Poland 
is consistently classified in class I except in 2005 (class 
II). Based on the EBRD 2005 ranking, Poland is ranked 
as meeting high compliance of OECD principles in 
corporate governance.
4
 This corroborates the literature 
indicating that Poland’s corporate governance in legal 
reforms and practice is much further in development 
than most of the other new EU countries. Poland may 
represent the convergence of corporate governance 
regulations among the European transition countries. 
After achieving 2004 EU membership, Poland may have 
less incentive to improve on their corporate governance 
practices. Political inertia in reforms is a major factor in 
stalling reform efforts after post-accession. Lithuania 
and Croatia are also consistently classified in class I. 
Croatia is still an accession country and may be making 
greater efforts to implement a corporate governance 
regime that induces investor confidence and favorable 
EU scrutiny. The Slovak Republic (2000 and 2005) and 
Estonia (1990 and 2000) are consistently classified in 
the last class with a medium compliance rating by 
EBRD. The Czech Republic (1990), Hungary (1995), 
and Bulgaria (1995) are also classified in class IV. 
                                                 
4
 None of the transition countries were ranked by EBRD 
as having met the criterion of “Very High Compliance”. 
Based on the assumption of English heritage origin 
of corporate governance, Poland is consistently 
classified in class I (1990, 1995 and 2000) (Table 5). 
Poland seems to be evolving closer to the English 
heritage in corporate governance regime. Although the 
EBRD ranking in 2005 is still ranked as high 
compliance the 2005 SMR ranking grouped Poland in 
class II, indicating a decrease in corporate governance 
practices. The furthest from the English legal origin of 
corporate governance by SMR ranking are the Czech 
Republic (in all years), Latvia (2000 and 2005), 
Hungary, Estonia, and Slovak Republic (in various 
years). Croatia seems to be consistently ranked in class 
II in all years except 2005 and ranked by 2005 EBRD as 
medium compliance. 
Table 6 presents the assumption under French legal 
origin. Croatia, Bulgaria and Estonia are consistently 
classified in class I under this assumption. Poland, in the 
early phase of reforms, is ranked in class I in 1990 but 
moved further away in 1995 (grouped in class IV). 
Similarly, Croatia moves from class I (1990 and 1995) 
to class II (2000) to class III (2005) under the French 
legal origin. This is consistent with the above analysis 
that Croatia is moving closer to the English legal origin 













2005 EBRD 2005 
Poland 0.918058 Poland 0.763707 Poland 0.78206 Bulgaria 0.900395 C 
Lithuania 0.748956 Slovenia 0.739397 Bulgaria 0.760754 Lithuania 0.81125 B 
Latvia 0.616791 Lithuania 0.627971 Croatia 0.603225 Romania 0.729487 D 
Croatia 0.557151 Estonia 0.573946 Romania 0.583021 Estonia 0.719269 C 
Slovenia 0.52724 Croatia 0.511059 Lithuania 0.577751 Slovenia 0.675227 C 
Romania 0.409534 Slovak 0.49512 Slovenia 0.52486 Hungary 0.548224 B 
Slovak 0.356412 Romania 0.365029 Estonia 0.524576 Croatia 0.481943 C 
Bulgaria 0.330519 Latvia 0.361139 Hungary 0.351828 Poland 0.422198 B 
Hungary 0.279237 Bulgaria 0.274213 Slovak 0.168429 Slovak 0.362373 C 
Estonia 0.174498 Czech 0.207345 Czech 0.141036 Latvia 0.151583 B 
Czech 0.13651 Hungary -0.00679 Latvia 0.084246 Czech 0.010951 C 
SMR  0.459537 SMR  0.446558 SMR  0.463799 SMR  0.528445 
 
SMRS  0.229768 SMRS  0.223279 SMRS  0.231899 SMRS  0.264223 
SMRSSMR  0.229768 SMRSSMR  0.223279 SMRSSMR  0.231899 SMRSSMR  0.264223 
SMRSSMR  0.689305 SMRSSMR  0.669837 SMRSSMR  0.695698 SMRSSMR  0.792668 
 
 




Under the assumption of German legal origin, 
Poland is ranked in class I in 1990, in class IV in 1995, 
in class III in 2000, and in class II in 2005 (Table 7). 
Poland had very close German ties, culturally and 
historically. Poland seems to be less consistent in 
corporate governance regime under the German legal 
origin unlike under the English legal origin assumption. 
The Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and Latvia tend to be 
ranked in the last class, furthest from the German legal 
origin. In particular, the 2005 SMR rankings indicate 
that Latvia, Croatia, and the Czech Republic are moving 
away from the German legal origin while Poland (class 
II) is moving closer. It is worth noting that Romania, 
ranked by the 2005 EBRD as low compliance, is ranked 
in class I under the German legal origin assumption. 
The assumption of the Scandinavian legal origin 
indicates that Estonia, Croatia, and Bulgaria, (with the 
 
Table 6. 









2005 EBRD 2005 
Poland 0.933239 Croatia 0.720599 Bulgaria 0.955499 Bulgaria 0.950134 C 
Croatia 0.812832 Estonia 0.697538 Romania 0.806468 Estonia 0.917265 C 
Lithuania 0.662734 Latvia 0.62765 Poland 0.793812 Romania 0.887066 D 
Latvia 0.620844 Slovak 0.535809 Croatia 0.773079 Lithuania 0.798724 B 
Slovenia 0.547685 Romania 0.528948 Estonia 0.675098 Hungary 0.694573 B 
Slovak 0.54173 Czech 0.473446 Hungary 0.496203 Poland 0.491809 B 
Romania 0.512885 Lithuania 0.427126 Czech 0.465364 Slovak 0.456048 C 
Bulgaria 0.327424 Bulgaria 0.413182 Lithuania 0.376983 Latvia 0.445202 B 
Hungary 0.272488 Slovenia 0.367146 Slovak 0.364012 Croatia 0.370359 C 
Estonia 0.14995 Poland 0.033136 Latvia 0.35644 Slovenia 0.337462 C 
Czech 0.111506 Hungary 0.032577 Slovenia -0.0464 Czech -0.02028 C 
SMR   0.499392 SMR  0.44156 SMR  0.54696 SMR  0.575305 
 
SMRS  0.249696 SMRS  0.22078 SMRS  0.27348 SMRS  0.287653 
SMRSSMR  0.249696 SMRSSMR  0.22078 SMRSSMR  0.27348 SMRSSMR  0.287653 













2005 EBRD 2005 
Poland 0.876171 Croatia 0.750556 Poland 0.89398 Romania 0.802215 D 
Croatia 0.804995 Czech 0.709007 Bulgaria 0.858094 Hungary 0.801308 B 
Lithuania 0.716983 Slovak 0.696155 Croatia 0.791055 Bulgaria 0.78566 C 
Slovak 0.60327 Latvia 0.5483 Romania 0.62936 Estonia 0.72264 C 
Slovenia 0.598221 Slovenia 0.522737 Hungary 0.513456 Poland 0.636037 B 
Latvia 0.445008 Romania 0.431526 Slovenia 0.496099 Slovak 0.588902 C 
Romania 0.418069 Estonia 0.406909 Lithuania 0.366384 Lithuania 0.468566 B 
Hungary 0.37304 Lithuania 0.374945 Czech 0.356701 Slovenia 0.398672 C 
Czech 0.236708 Bulgaria 0.214557 Slovak 0.341297 Latvia 0.250166 B 
Bulgaria 0.198421 Hungary 0.122887 Estonia 0.32578 Czech 0.146915 C 
Estonia 0.091184 Poland 0.083275 Latvia 0.0183 Croatia 0.060792 C 
SMR  0.487461 SMR  0.441896 SMR  0.508228 SMR  0.514716 
 
SMRS  0.24373 SMRS  0.220948 SMRS  
SMRS  SMRS  
0.257358 
SMRSSMR  0.24373 SMRSSMR  0.220948 SMRSSMR  0.254114 SMRSSMR  0.257358 
SMRSSMR  0.731191 SMRSSMR  0.662844 SMRSSMR  0.762342 SMRSSMR  0.772074 
 




exception of Poland in1990) in the early years, are 
closest in corporate governance regime, ranked in class I 
(Table 8). In contrast, Croatia moved from class I to 
class IV in 2005 which is consistent with the previous 
analysis that Croatia is moving closer over time to the 
English legal origin. Romania is ranked in class II 
reflecting the least corporate governance afforded 
investors in 2005 which is consistent with the 2005 
EBRD ranking of low compliance. 
However, Bulgaria and Romania are relatively late 
accession countries and their desire to accede to the EU 
membership may spur these countries to improve their 
corporate governance in practice to a greater degree in 
later years than post accession countries like Poland or 
the Czech Republic with fewer incentives after 
achieving EU membership. Therefore, Bulgaria and 
Romania’s compliance with OECD corporate 
governance principles is not ranked highly by EBRD 
having a later start in initiating reforms than the other 
countries.  
Comparing the SMR and EBRD rankings in 2005, 
the biggest similarity is seen for Tables 4 and 6. 
Continental Europe may be closer in convergence in 
corporate governance regime to the French legal origin, 
although it is observed by Martynova and Renneboog 
that “the French legal origin countries have evolved and 
reach a level closer to the English origin standard” (p. 
20). The difference between the SMR and EBRD 
rankings among some of the transition countries may be 
due to the issue of improvement in stockholder rights 
and protection on the books and the actual legal 
enforcement of those rights. The consistent and timely 
enforcement of an investor’s legal rights are either 
subverted by cronyism as in Bulgaria, or the onerous 
process of getting legal redress even in countries that are 
in the forefront of corporate governance, like Poland. 
4.  Conclusion 
Transition countries that are more advanced in 
capital market development seem to be converging 
towards the English legal origin regime of corporate 
governance, in particular, Poland. The later EU2007 
accession countries like Bulgaria, Romania and 
accession country Croatia also seem to be moving 
toward the English legal regime over time as well. The 
later EU2007 accession countries seem to learn from the 
experience of the earlier accession countries and lean 
towards the English legal origin regime. Some of the 
transition countries have also regressed over time as 
measured by the SMR rankings, in particular, Poland 
from the English legal regime. Other countries are the 
Czech Republic and Latvia. Estonia seems to be moving 
towards the Scandinavian and German regime of less 
protection for investors. Given that continental 
transition countries are mostly characterized by 
stakeholder-based regime, the paper shows that the later 
trend in most of the countries is towards a stockholder-
based US-UK regime. 
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